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Abstract
This paper explores the conditions that characterize the optimality for a principal
(health manager) to undertake investments to motivate agents (doctors). In the model,
doctors are intrinsically motivated and can have different identities. We develop a
principal agent dynamical model with moral hazard, which captures the possibility of
affecting doctors’ intrinsic motivation and identity through contracts offered by the
health manager. Identity and intrinsic motivation of the doctor can be undermined
(crowding-out) or enhanced (crowding-in) by incentive policies and monetary rewards.
When motivations beyond the money play a role in the agents behaviour, the optimality
of the equilibrium outcomes may be altered.
Intrinsic motivation is defined as doctor’s experienced enjoyment from doing her
work and commit toward a mission. By “full” identity we mean a situation in which
the doctor shares the organizational objectives and views herself as a part of the
organization. We assume that “full” identity can be achieved when health managers
include mission supportive investments in contracts. This also crowds in intrinsic
motivation. However, crowding out occurs when the health manager uses only pure
monetary rewards to incentivize doctors with the goal of drive their actions in his own
interest.
Solving the model, we are allowed to make comparative statics and discuss the
conditions under which spending resources to invest in motivational capital, is optimal
for the health organization’s manager. Our results may help to inform policy-makers
about optimal policy design and optimal management of health organizations. For
instance, we conclude that investing in motivational capital is more likely to be prof-
itable in the long run whereas mere monetary incentives are more likely to be optimal
in the short run.
Keywords: contracts, moral hazard, intrinsic motivation, crowding effects, motivational capital.
JEL Codes: D03, D86.
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1 Introduction
The present work aims to throw light to give answer to some questions about doctors’
intrinsic motivation, identity, and the economic effects we can expect from these. Is the
motivation of the doctors other kind of capital in which the health care organizations should
invest? Is doctors’ identity and motivation another productive asset of the health care
organizations? How should organizations’ managers design the mechanisms and incentives
in order to benefit from this “Motivational Capital”? Could identity be the key to avoid
the opportunistical behaviour of the doctors who sometimes game the system for their
self-interest?
Other questions are also of much significance facing the above listed ones. Say for
example, which determinants are on the basis of doctors’ intrinsic motivation? Are doctors
intrinsically motivated or they are just self interested income maximizers as assumed by the
standard economics? How the actions of the managers and government officers of the health
affect this intrinsic motivation? Can health care organizations’ principals reduce costs by
mean of crowd in doctors’ intrinsic motivation? Answering properly these questions involve
a deep discussion and a deep thought on concepts such as Intrinsic Motivation, Crowding-in
and Crowding-out effects, Identity, Mission,. . .
The motivation of workers at the public sector has been an issue in the recent economic
literature. James Q. Wilson’s work (1989) entitled “Bureaucracy: what government agencies
do and why they do it” is a common startpoint for this body of the literature. The topic
under discussion is that privately owned competitive firms do not performance optimally
when the good that have to be supplied is a collective good such as education, health,
civil and social safety, a common pool resource or a public good. In the provision of these
collective goods the role played by competition and the optimal incentives may differ from
the private competitive provision of them.
One emergent explanation of the above question focuses on the fact that organizations
that provide collective goods pursue goals and objectives, which are not necessarily monetary
profitable, and the motivation of the employees who work within these organizations goes
beyond the expected monetary gain. People who work in the provision of collective goods
sector are generally intrinsically motivated agents who pursue goals because they perceive
satisfaction from the very act of doing so. That is to say that these workers benefit in some
degree just from exerting effort in the provision of the collective goods. Teachers, doctors,
firefighters, policemen or social workers are good examples of such intrinsically motivated
workers. Julian LeGrand’s book Motivation, agency, and public policy: of knights and
knaves, pawns and queens LeGrand [32] is an excellent, bright and original work showing
the role played by intrinsic motivation in public sector positions and professionals.
A related body of work has centered the atention in the role played by the intrinsic
motivation and the notion that non pecuniary aspects of motivation matter (Bowles [12],
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Bowles and Polania [14], Benabou and Tirole [7], Frey [29], Frey and Jegen [30], Paul
Seabright [44], Kevin Murdock [35] ). This branch of the literature also points out the
importance of the crowding out effect of the monetary rewards and other material payments
on the intrinsic motivation. In these works, therefore, there is an interplay between the
principal’s action and the agent’s intrinsic motivation and thus there is a chance to affect
agent‘s intrinsic motivation through the choice behavior of the principal.
Another substantial body of work on economics has approached that topic from a per-
spective based on the individual identity. More precisely, in these works intrinsic motivation
is examined as a matter which depends on how workers see themselves in relation to the
firm. Workers’ identification with their positions, jobs, tasks, etc. creates identities which
make organizations perform better, due to the higher productivity of those motivated and
identificated workers. Akerlof and Kranton [2], grant to this definition of the identity the
value of being “a way to motivate employees, different than incentives from monetary com-
pensation”, and they follow saying that “[. . . ] a change in identity is the ideal motivator if,
[. . . ] the effort of a worker is either hard to observe or hard to reward”.
Besley and Ghatak [10] propose another approach to the intrinsically motivated be-
haviours, also related with the concept of identity in the [2] sense of identification as a
shared goal. They state that there are two types of firms in the production of goods: non-
for-profit or mission oriented firms, and for-profit or maximun profit seeking firms. The
former, are firms usually engaged in the provision of collective goods, and workers whithin
them are motivated in the sense that they pursue goals just because they perceive benefits
for doing so. They define these goals as missions and they show that the principal will offer
weaker incentives to elicit effort when he shares the employees’ missions. In the same line
Prendergast [42] proposes a concept of intrinsic motivation similar to [2]. They put the
attention in the intrinsic motivation generated when alignment of preferences between firm
and worker happens, not only in the case in which these preferences are money centered
but also when other non monetary reasons matter. To sum up, in Akerlof and Kranton [2];
Besley and Ghatak [10]; Prendergast [42], the intrinsic motivation is shown as a firm-specific
identity or motivation, in the same sense of the firm-specific human capital.
The scope of the present work is centered in the role played by the intrinsic motivation
and the identity of the doctors working at the public health system. Our analysis also
incorporates the crowding effects, which can undermine or enhance this inner motivations
and identities. In the same line of Bowles [12], Bowles and Hwang [13] and Bowles and
Polanía [14] we avoid the standard economics approach of the separability between intrinsic
and extrinsic motivations of the economic agents. We capture in a principal agent model,
the fact that the incentives policy is a way to influence the identity and also intrinsic
motivation, either positively (crowding in) or negatively (crowding out). Crowding in means
that incentives and intrinsic motivation are complements, and crowding out means that
incentives and intrinsic motivation, are substitutes. We assume that usually in designing
“motivating” contracts, there is additional cost and there is a trade-off relation between this
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cost and the productivity improvement for the organization by having motivated or “good”
identity workers.
Characterizing the conditions under which the contracts enforce and incentivize intrinsi-
cally motivated behaviours and identities, we can state how health organizations can benefit
from motivated doctors in terms of cost efficiency and health effectiveness. If lower incen-
tives are enough to elicit “good” behaviors in motivated doctors, health organizations will
save a non-negligible amount of financial resources. Depending on the lenght of the con-
tract proposed by the health organization, there will be a profitable chance to invest in
motivation. This chance arises when the present value of the time stream of the expected
saved cost overcomes the initial amount invested in eliciting “good” identity and crowding
in intrinsic motivation. In such a case we state that investing in Motivational Capital is a
source of monetary profits which leads health organizations to higher efficiency level in the
provision of health.
2 Motivation and Basic Concepts
First it is necesary to clarify the meaning of some words and concepts involved in the work.
Intrinsic Motivation−. Porter and Lawler [43] were the first in proposing a model of
extrinsic and intrinsic work motivation. They stated that intrinsic motivation involves
people doing an activity because they find it interesting and derive spontaneous satisfaction
from the activity itself. Starting from this view intrinsically motivated activities were defined
as those from which individuals benefit just from the very act of doing them. Individuals
engage in these activities even in absence of operationally separable consequences such as
rewards or punishments. A first definition of the intrinsic motivation can be found in Deci
[19]1
One is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives
no apparent reward except the activity itself. (p.105)
Thus we consider intrinsic motivation as the willingness to perform in a given activity
without any external reinforcement because the doing of an interesting activity is itself
intrinsically rewarded. In a more general way Deci and Ryan [21] defined intrinsic motivation
as,
Intrinsically motivated behaviors are those that are freely engaged out of inter-
est without necessity of separable consequences, and, to be mantained, they require
satisfaction of the needs for autonomy and competence. (p.233)
1There are an extense literature in psychology and economics that analyze the importance of the role
played by intrinsic motivation in individual and social behaviour: Benabou and Tirole [7] [8]; Besley and
Ghatak [10]; Bowles and Polanía [14]; Deci and Ryan [23]; DeCharms [18]; Frey [29]; Frey and Jegen [30];
Murdock [35]).
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In the context of doctors, health managers, and health organizations, intrinsic motivation
can be seen as the willingness showed by doctors to exert effort and spend energy to perform
in those dimensions of the medical activity which are of their interest. Collaborating and
participating in teaching, research, offering extra time to study and work on interesting and
specific cases, cooperation, and so forth.
As we will see, intrinsic motivation, is closely related with the concept of mission which
we will discuss and explain below.
Mission−.The necessity of developing a sense of mission2 was discussed first time in
Wilson [46]. He pointed out the importance for an organization to avoid “vague objectives”
and to define a set of “critical tasks” or “operational goals”. In his own words,
The “culture” of an organization is a way to see what these critical tasks are and
how to deal with them. (p.93)
A “mission” is a single culture that is widely and enthusiastically shared by the
members of the organization. (p.99)
In our model “mission” has to do also with the Wilson’s view. But is different in some
sense, because “mission” is the single culture that is shared by doctors. This culture is a
matter of non-material rewards and has to do with the sense of duty and purpose, individual
recognition and personal power, and the associative benefits that come from being part of
an organization.
Bureaucrats have preferences. Among them is the desire to do the job. That
desire may spring entirely out of a sense of duty, or it may arise out of a willingness
to conform to the expectations of fellow workers and superiors even when there is no
inmediate financial advantage in doing so. (p. 156).
Wilson stated that many of most productive firms have tried to substitute monetary
incentives with the culture of mission.
In business where one might suppose that money incentives are the whole story,
great efforts have been made by the most productive firms to supplement those incen-
tives with a sense of mission based on a shared organizational culture. (p.157)
Thus a mission is understood as the way in which doctors would like to perform and
do in their profession. They have preferences to be empathetic with patients, to do extra
work when this is required for the wellness of patients. Also they have preferences toward
2A deep discussion of the concept of mission in the public agencies and organizations has been shown
in many works. James Q. Wilson’s 1989 book Bureaucracy can be considered as the pioneer work, and
following the line drawn by this work, the concept of mission has been incorporated to the economic
analysis by Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole [24] [25]; Besley and Ghatak [10]; Prendergast [40] [41] [42].
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research and scientific knowledge, or they enjoy from teaching, learning and getting further
education. The addition of all of these “critical tasks” or “operational goals” resulting in a
“culture” shared by doctors, in a group, service, team is what we mean as “mission”.
This sense of mission is related with doctors’ Intrinsic Motivation. The mission prefer-
ences defined this way are on the basis of how doctors benefit from the very fact of doing
their work or activity. That is, how they can perform in their profession in the way they
would like and enjoy.
Crowding effects−. External intervention, e.g. monetary incentives, punishments, awards,
command and control policies, and so forth, may undermine, and under some identifiable
conditions strengthen, the intrinsic motivation3. This is what we know as crowding effect,
that is the effect produced by the external intervention on individual’s intrinsic motivation.
Crowding out happens when external intervention undermines individual’s intrinsic mo-
tivation. Analogously, crowding in will happen when external intervention strengthens in-
dividual’s intrinsic motivation4. Over the last few years, the theories of intrinsic motivation
emanating from social psychology have been integrated into economics yielding explana-
tory and succesful results. Arguably, the crowding out effect is one of the most important
anomalies in economics, which acts in opposite to the most fundamental economic ‘law’,
that raising monetary incentives increases supply. What is well established, is that all inter-
ventions originating from outside the person under consideration may crowd out or crowd
in intrinsic motivation.
There are two basic approaches in the literature explaining the channels through which,
these crowding effects may happen.
1. A change in preferences. Agent’s behaviour changes in reponse to an external inter-
vention and reveals an altered amount of intrinsic motivation. The observed change
in behaviour is attributed to a change in preferences5.
2. A change in the perceived nature of the performed task, in the task-environment or
in the actor’s self-perception. This approach explains the changes in the individual
behaviour mantaining the standard economic assumption of fixed preferences6.
Sam Bowles and Sandra Polanía [14], in a recent review of the literature on crowding
effects in public goods experiments, summarize the channels through which the crowding
out effect acts in four:
3There is an extense literature which shows the existence of crowding effects. Camerer and Hogarth [17];
Frey and Jegen [30]; Bowles and Polanía [14] are depth reviews.
4Benabou and Tirole [7] [8]; Bowles [12]; Bowles and Polanía [14]; Frey [29]; Frey and Jegen [30]; Deci
and Ryan [23]; Deci, Koestner and Ryan [22]; Gagné and Deci [31]; LeGrand [32].
5Frey [29]; Frey and Jegen [30].
6Benabou and Tirole [6] [7] [8] [9].
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1. Incentives provide information affecting the behaviour of the target in ways additional
to the effects on the material costs and benefits of the target’s actions.
2. Incentives provide cues of appropiate behaviour.
3. Incentives may compromise Self-determination and crowd out intrinsic motives7.
4. The effects of the incentives in preferences may persist over long periods even in the
subsequent absence of the incentives (endogenous preferences).
Identity−. Identity has to do with person’s self-image, how people feel about themselves,
how people think of themselves in terms of social categories, and how people think that they
and others should behave8.
Identity plays a crucial role in our model. In the model dentity is the degree to which,
the goals of both players are aligned. A measure of how precisely doctors and health organi-
zations share goals and objectives. In other words the degree to which, the doctor internalize
and assume the organizational goals and also the degree to which, health managers support
and share doctors’ mission preferences.
Identity in our model weakens themoral hazard incentive constraint because makes effort
subjectively less costly for the doctor. A doctor with ‘good’ identity, exerting high effort is
the ideal way to behave, because she views herself as being part of the organization.
Socialization−. Socialization, in the model, is the process through which the doctor
and Health organization goals match. This will occur when brought out by the principal
investment actions supporting doctors’ mission preferences, the identity of doctors switch
towards the good one. Thus, socialization occurs when finally doctors internalize organi-
zational goals and both players’ objectives results aligned. On the contrary, we mean as
conflict the process which brings the doctor to completely disagree with the organizational
goals at the end.
Motivational Capital− In general, less incentives are needed to elicit effort when orga-
nization have “full” identity motivated workers9. Thus we can consider the motivation as
another productive asset of the organization over which the principal may decide to invest.
Then, the motivational capital could be identified with the measure of the present value of
the stream of the expected costs saved by the health organization, when health manager
invests S to improve doctors’ identity through supporting her mission preferences.
We introduce the possibility that contracts may affect this intrinsic motivation, either
possitively (crowding in) and also negatively (crowding out). We mean as crowding-in
7Deci and Ryan [23]; Deci and Ryan [21].
8Sen [45]; Akerlof and Kranton [1] [2]
9Motivational capital was formulated first time in Akerlof and Kranton [2].
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incentive scheme one that gives support to the mission oriented preferences of doctors.
Examples of such mission supportive behaviour of the principal in health organizations
might be: public award of research in health results, financial aid for researching activities,
further education and teaching at university level, investing in new technologies, funding
for research groups, financing of publication services, aid for organize advanced courses and
seminars, include discussion and self-evaluative group activities within the worktime, etc.
This way, the identity may be encouraged and the intrinsic motivation of the doctor may
be enhanced. In such a case, the moral hazard in the game is weakened making the doctors’
and health manager’s objetives more aligned.
Figure 1: Principal Agent relations in health organizations I.
However, as we can see often in the real world, principals in health are significatively
focused on their private benefits. They put a lot of weight maximizing the expected number
of votes in elections or improving political popularity indexes at the same time as they have
a picture of doctors as self interested profit maximizing agents. Thus they are biased to
maximize performance measures that are easily obsevables by the electorate and therefore
have a great impact on the public opinion.
Figure 1, depicts all the principal agent relations in health and summarize the goals of the
players involved in health: managers and doctors. Arrows reflect principal agent relations.
Thus, the electorate or tax payers are the principal and govenment is the agent in the higher
level principal agent relation. Government’s task consist in organizing in an efficient way
the public resources trying to maximize some publicly observable measures of performance
which, are of great impact in public opinion: reduce the waiting time in waiting lists,
increase the number of surgeries made in common patologies, increase the infraestructures,
buy new technology assets, reduce the cost an save resources, or enlarge the range of the
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services supplied for instance. In general all of them quantitative performance measures.
Governments hire managers to manage hospitals in the second level principal agent relation
in health. These managers can be more aligned with doctors or with government advisors.
We assume that managers and government collude in the government goals.
On the right side, figure 1 shows the principal agent relation between doctors and pa-
tients. This relation is captured in the figure with the dashed line labelled with the word
mission. Doctors’ goals are focused toward patients who are a subset belonging to all the
tax payers or electorate. We assume that doctors’ mission is to do the work with the goal
of maximize patients welfare. Say for instance, more personalized medical assistence or the
inmediate incorporation of advanced treatments. Also whithin doctors’ mission, we can
find other activities like research, further education or teaching, which all of these have to
do with becoming better professional and become more skilled doing her work and trying
to maximize patients welfare. Mission, thus, can be different from health managers’ goals
and objectives. This divergence in objectives is a source of conflict in health and generates
confrontation between doctors and health managers. This conflic is what the figure 1 shows
with principal agent relation which is represented with the dashed line in the bottom.
The central issue in this work is that, there is a possibility for the health manager to make
investments to alleviate the conflict degree. If we assume that any doctor is intrinsically
motivated for doing her work in line with her mission and also that health manager can
use some amount of resources to facilitate this mission oriented behaviour, then is possible
to change the identity of the doctor. Thus doctors will view herself as a part of the whole
health organization. This way objectives turn aligned and shared, and both parties will look
after about the other goals. This idea is what we have wanted to capture with the concept
of identity.
Health principals neglect doctors’ mission preferences and intrinsic motivation. This
neglecting behaviour becomes explicit in the contracts and incentive schemes offered and,
as a consequence, the intrinsic motivation of doctors is hurted. Doctors observe that their
mission is not being supported, take outsider identity, and conflict arise because objectives
of both are not aligned. In this context the incentives necessary to overcome moral hazard
in the tasks related to the objectives of the principal raise, making the costs of elicit effort
higher.
There will exist a maximun total amount of resources that the health manager can
spend in supporting the mission of doctors in a private profitable way. This amount will
be therefore characterized by the difference between the saved costs coming from loosen
the moral hazard in the case of crowding in, and the higher incentives that the principal
has to offer to elicit effort in the case of crowding out. Which of these two overweight the
other will put the principal in one way or another. When the conditions make crowding
in policies more profitable, then the health organization’s manager has interest to invest in
motivational capital. The conditions for this latter case occurs depends on, the distribution
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of types, the socialization speed rate and the range of the incentive payments, which at the
same time depends on the informative value of the performance measure about doctor’s
action.
3 The Model
We want to analyze the optimality of contracts in a principal agent model in which the
agent (she) is intrinsically motivated at some level, and the principal’s (he) action choice,
may affect the agent’s intrinsic motivation. Such influence can be both, positive or negative.
Put in other words, may respectively crowd in or crowd out the agent’s intrinsic motivation.
We want to capture in the model if such possibility to affect the agent’s inner motiva-
tions through principal’s actions may influence the optimality properties of the incentive
contracts. Specifically, if taking into account the crowding effects, the principal might
have chances to move toward more profitable outcomes. This question has been neglected
by standard Contract Theory, which traditionally has assumed that economic agents are
purely motivated by material self-interest.
In the present section of the paper, first we are going to describe in a precise way the
channel through which the crowding effects happen and, second, we will go to deal with the
task of formalize and incorporate them into the model. Then, we will define the game and
finally we will solve it computing all the posible equilibria to make the comparative statics.
3.1 Players’ Preferences and Utilities.
There are two players in the game: the agent A (doctor) and the principal P10. The
population of doctors whithin the organization, however, is a number n > 2. Therefore,
despite the optimal payments can be calculated one-by-one, in order to compute the total
cost that P must face we have to multiply by n the single expected cost of payments. We
assume that A is intrinsically motivated. We also restrict the analysis to linear contracts.
We model a finite period t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... principal-agent dynamical game where the
doctor’s effort is of private information. Doctors’ behaviour is also driven by identity and
intrinsic motivation. Identity and intrinsic motivation, both, affect doctor’s preferences and,
at the same time can be affected by the health manager action choice.
10Often we use she and he to refer to the agent and the principal respectively, as conventionally the
principal agent literature does.
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3.1.1 The Principal: Health Manager
First, assume that for the health manager P , there is a performance measure q that he wants
to maximize. We focus on the problem of how to maximize this performance efficiently using
incentives which could be material or of the nature of “carrots and sticks” or also of non-
monetary nature. Then the starting point of this work is the incentivization of an extra or a
marginal health outcome summed up in the performance measure q. Another assumption is
that this q is a target outcome for P but is not an objective for A, and therefore is necessary
to use incentives to maximize it.
Let Rt(qt) be a function which transforms the performance level into health manager’s
material rewards. These material rewards could be the expected number of votes, popularity
indexes, and the kind of measures that are salient and used to evaluate the government action
by the electorate or tax payers.
Let qt be the performance measure observed by the electorate and also by the health
manager. This performance is a function of the doctor’s effort et ∈ {e, e}. Assume that
qt ∈ {q, q} where q > q11. Let p(qt = q|et) = θi be the probability of high performance
conditional to A’s effort choice i = 0, 1 where 0 means low effort e and 1 means high effort
e. Then p(qt = q|et = 1) = θ1 will be the probability of high performance when the doctor
exerts effort, and p(qt = q|et = e) = θ0 the probability of high performance when the doctor
does not exert effort. Alternatively p(qt = q|et = 1) = 1− θ1 and p(qt = q|et = e) = 1− θ0
will be the probabilities of low performance when effort is exerted and effort is not exerted,
respectively. We assume that θ1 > θ0, that is performance q˜t is an informative signal of e˜t
Now we can define E[Rt(qt)|θi] as the expected material rewards achieved by the health
manager12 conditional to qt, the achieved performance level.
Let wt(qt) be the performance contingent monetary payment offered to A by P . Then,
E[wt(qt)|θi] will be the expected monetary payment for the doctor or A, and the expected
monetary cost for the health organization or P at the same time. Let s0 be the total
amount of invested resources to change A’s identity. That is to say that P only can make
an investment to change the As’ identity at the starting period of the game t = 0 as an
initial investment. This investment generates a cost stream that we capture with the cost
function Ct(s0). Thus we will be able to write P ’s problem in a single equation. Then the
health manager’s P problem will be to maximize the profit function described below.
Then P ’s profit function pit for each period t can be written as,
11Take q as P’s target on performance level and q as a fail in target performance level
12Here the material profits are defined as if these would be the same for the health manager and the
government. We assume perfect collusion between the health manager and the health advisor of the govern-
ment. Thus when we refer to P we don’t distinguish between both of them, health manager and government
advisor.
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pit = E[Rt(qt)|θi]− E[wt(qt)|θi]− Ct(s0) (1)
Where the investment cost function Ct(s0) is such that, takes the value C0(S) = S in
t = 0 and an depreciation cost Ct(S) = γS for every t > 1 at constant depreciaton rate γ.
3.1.2 Agent’s preferences: the doctor
We represent the A’s preferences with the following expected utility function.
E[UAt |θi] = E[ut(w˜t)|θi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected utility from income
− ψt(et,
Identity︷ ︸︸ ︷
υt(s0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Disutility from effort
+
Intrinsic motivation︷ ︸︸ ︷
φt
(
Ωt︸︷︷︸
Incentives
,mt(s0)
)
(2)
The first term on the right hand side of the above utility function, E[ut(w˜t)|θi], is the
expected utility from monetary transfer. The agent is risk averse, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, and
the parameter θi is the probability of high or low performance.
The middle term on the right hand side of the utility function ψt(et, υt(s0)) disutility
from effort. The disutility from effort depends negatively on υt(s0) which is a function
representing A’s identity and depends positively from effort. The properties of the disutility
from effort are summed up in the following set of assumptions.
A1: The function ψt(et, υt(s0)) is continuous in the interval [υ, υ].
A2: The function ψt(et, υt(s0)) is strictly decreasing inits second argument
when et = e. That is, ∂ψt(e,υt)∂υt |et=e < 0.
A3: When et = e, then ψt(e, υt) = 0; ∀υt ∈ [υ, υ].
A4: The function ψt(et, υt(s0)) is bounded below and above. Is bounded below when ψt(e, υt) =
0 ∀υt, and ψt(e, υ) = 0. The function is bounded above when ψt(e, υ) = Ψ.
The above assumptions ensure that, when identity converge to its upper (lower) bound,
then A’s disutility from doing high effort converges to zero (Ψ). That is, the agent does not
suffer disutility from exerting high effort when she has high identity. Contrary, when she
has low identity, A experiences the maximun disutiliy from effort when she exerts effort.
The only way to avoid this disutility when identity is low is to choose the low effort action.
The last term φt(Ωt,mt(s0)) on the right hand side of the utility function captures A’s
intrinsic motivation. This term is a function of her experienced level of enjoyment doing the
activity, work, task, or the job. This term has to do with her own effectiveness achieving
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her mission oriented goals mt(s0). This effectiveness degree mt(s0) also depends on the P
investment in motivational capital st. We have defined s0 as the resources spent by P in
supporting those activities toward which A is intrinsically motivated. Thus the mt(s0) can
be read as the measure of the A’s performance level in her mission [46]. Intrinsic motivation
also depends on incentives Ωt = ∆wt13. What is a key feature of the model is that these
two terms are interdependent and thus material rewards may affect the intrinsic motivation
through crowding effects. The properties of this intrinsic motivation function are summed
up in the following set of assumptions.
B1: The function mt(s0) takes two possible values, mt(s0) ∈ {m,M}, where
m < M , mt(S) = M , and mt(0) = m.
B2: Let Ωt = ∆wt = wt(q)−wt(q) be the measure of the intensity of incentives. Then, for
any fixed value of Ωt, Ω∗ ∈ [0,∞) we have ∆(mt)φt = φt((Ω)∗,M)− φt((Ω)∗,m) > 0.
B3: The function φt(Ωt,mt(s0)) is continuous and upper and lower bounded in the interval
[0,Φ] where,
lim
Ωt→∞
φt(Ωt,m) = 0 lim
Ωt→0
φt(Ωt,M) = Φ.
lim
Ωt→ 0
φt(Ωt,m) < lim
Ωt→0
φt(Ωt,M) = Φ = Sup φt.
Inf φt = 0 = lim
Ωt→∞
φt(Ωt,m) < lim
Ωt→∞
φt(Ωt,M).
B4: The function φt(Ωt,mt(s0)) is strictly decreasing in its first argument.
∂φt(Ωt,mt)
∂Ωt
< 0.
B5: For simplicity, we assume that the negatively sloped relation between Ωt and φt(·) is
linear,
∂2φt(Ωt,m)
∂Ω2t
= 0.
13What the literature of crowding effects exactly says, is that intrinsic motivation depends negatively
from monetary incentives. This is what they call crowding out effect: see for example Bowles [12]; Bowles
and Hwang [13]; Bowles and Polanía [14]; Deci [19]; Deci and Ryan [23] [21]; Frey [29]; Frey and Jegen [30]
and LeGrand [32]. Other works, from psychology, show the possibility of crowding in or improve intrinsic
motivation using incentives focused in supplying more autonomy, recognition, or effectance doing work. See
Deci [19]; Deci and Ryan [23];[21]; Gágne and Deci [31]; LeGrand [32].
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Assumption B2 captures in some sense what Bowles and Polanía [14] call Categorical
Crowding out Effect14. Analogously, this categorical crowding out effect might be seen as
Categorical Crowding in Effect from the point of view of P , when he invests m(st) = M
in motivational capital. Assumption B4 also involves that intrinsic motivation is nega-
tively correlated with incentives as stated in the crowding effects literature. Assumption
B5 involves that both, the marginal crowding in and the marginal crowding out effects are
constant.
3.2 The Game
The game is a repeated game with two players, the agent or the doctor A and the principal
or the health manager P . We consider the game as a repeated dynamic recontracting game
in which every period both players have to make new choices: P must offer a new contract
after updating his beliefs about A’s type. Then, A has to choose a new effort level. Thus, we
analyze a repeated principal agent game with moral hazard, where the choices made by the
P affects A’s identity and intrinsic motivation. Reciprocally these changes in identity and
motivation affect the contracts and equilibrium payments offered by P in the next period.
3.2.1 Timing
Each period the game consists iof three stages: stage 0, stage 1, and stage 2. The sequence of
these stages at period t = 0 is graphically shown in figure 2. The timing of the within-period
in t = 0 is:
(0) The principal P learns the distribution of doctors’ identities F0(υ0) and the distribu-
tion of doctor’s intrinsic motivation G0(φ0). Then, he offers a contract to A. This contract
consists of a pair of stochastic contingent payments wυ,φ0 (q0) = {w,w} conditioned to the
expected value of identity E[υ0], the expected value of intrinsic motivation E[φ0]15, and the
choice to invest or not in motivational capital s0: {wυ,φ0 (q0), s0}.
(1) A accepts or refuses the contract. If she accepts, then choose an action over effort
e0 ∈ {e, e}. Contrary, if she refuses then she gets her reservation utility U .
(2) Finally, output is realized q0 ∈ {q, q}. Stochastic contingent payment is realized
wυ,φ0 (q0) = {w,w} and payoffs pi0 and U0 are realized.
Figure 3 shows the timing of the within-period game in t = 1, 2, ..., T, .... Such timing of
the within-period is as follows:
(0) The principal P updates the distribution of doctors’ identities Ft(υt|s0) conditioned
to his choice behaviour over investing or not in motivational capital s0. The principal P
14Bowles and Polanía [14], separate the crowding effects into two: categorical and marginal.
15In the game P has to contract at least n agents
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Figure 2: The timing of the game in the starting period t = 0.
also updates the distribution of doctors’ intrinsic motivation Gt(φt|s0,Ωt) conditioned also
to s0 and to incentives intensity Ωt. Then, he offers a contract to A: {wυ,φt (qt), st}.
(1) A accepts or refuses the contract. If she accepts, then choose an action over effort
et ∈ {e, e}. Contrary, if she refuses then she gets her reservation utility U .
(2) Finally, output is realized qt ∈ {q, q}. Stochastic contingent payment is realized
wυ,φt (qt) = {w,w} and payoffs pit and Ut are realized.
Figure 3: The timing of the game in the t=1,... periods.
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3.2.2 Information
At the first period of the game, P learns A’s type or identity16probability distribution
F0(υ0). Taking into account that his action s0 will affect the A’s type in a known way,
P will learn the A’s type distributions Ft(υt|s0) for the subsequent periods t = 1, ..., T, ...
where t ∈ N.
P also has to learn A’s intrinsic motivation. Then he also learns the probability dis-
tribution of intrinsically motivated doctors G0(φ0) in t = 0. Knowing that intrinsic moti-
vation depends negatively on monetary incentives and positively on his motivational cap-
ital investment behaviour17, then, he can learn Gt(φt|s0,Ωt) for the subsequent periods
t = 1, 2, ..., T, ... where t ∈ N.
3.2.3 Identity, Crowding effects, and Socialization
Doctors only differ in their identity and their intrinsic motivation degree. For all of them,
their skills and qualification for work at health is the same. They are equally efficient in
the production of qt. All doctors have the same probability distribution over performance
outcomes q = {q, q}. Therefore, P only deals with moral hazard because the differences in
motivation degree does not involve any difference in doctors’ efficiency producing q and the
distributionas are assumed to be known by P .
As we mean previously, incentives and contracts offered by the principal may change
agent’s intrinsic motivation and identity. Assume that there is a continuum of types of
doctors sorted by their identity, υ ∈ [υ, υ], with υ < υ.
We can see in the A’s utility function presented above that higher identity means lower
disutility from effort and higher intrinsic motivation18. Thus, Intuitively we can anticipate
that more identity needs less monetary incentives in order to overcome moral hazard and
elicit high effort level.
However, if the principal does not make any investment in motivational capital and only
use monetary incentives to elicit high effort, he will need to put more money than before
by two reasons: first, because the agent now will experience more disutility from effort, and
16We consider a continuum of types of A, υt ∈ [υ, υ] There is a possibility of switching As’ type or identity
making an investment in the starting period of the game. For a precise description of the time evolution of
the conditional distribution of types see the mathematical appendix.
17Taking into account Ωt and s0, P is able to know what direction will take the crowding effect. This
is because making s0 = S or s0 = 0, he knows that
dυt(S)
dt > 0 and
dυt(0)
dt < 0. As we will show later this
affects negatively Ωt. The intuition behind this correlation is that higher (lower) identity υt, means lower
(higher) disutility from effort, and therefore lower (higher) incentives Ωt. The relation
∂φt(·)
∂Ωt
< 0 makes the
rest.
18Just as intrinsic motivation and identity have been defined, these two variables are positively a mono-
tonically correlated in the model thus higher identity means higher intrinsic motivation.
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second, because the mere monetary incentivation will decrease the intrinsic motivation by
crowding out effect19.
What we want to capture with the socialization process20 is P ’s ability to make changes
in the identity of the agents by doing investments and organizative changes within the
organization. Thus if P chooses to invest s0 = S then he will switch As’ identity to a higher
level, bringing all of them to good identity. But if he decides not to invest, s0 = 0 then
agents will switch to lower identity level bringing all of them to the lowest identity. Mixing
monetary incentives and identity investments improves the A’s intrinsic motivation through
crowding in effect and contrary, the only use of monetary incentives will hurt A’s intrinsic
motivation through crowding out effect.21
3.2.4 Equilibrium
In order to solve the game and calculate the equilibrium outcome, first we set some assump-
tions and second we define P ’s problem. The first assumption is that the principal and the
agent can not commit themselves at t = 0, to any contract in the future periods. Then,
they have to renegotiate contracts at every period t. This assumption turns the game into
a dynamic re-contracting game. Then we solve the game implementing the spot contract
in each period of the game. In order to make the vector of the spot contracts as the long
term optimal solution we have to assumme no availability to renegotiate in the short term.
In this game the only way to agree upon a contract is playing the repeated game at every
period t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... as a new game.
Then we can write the P ’s problem as follows,
Max{wt(qt),s0}E[Rt(qt)|θi]− n · E[wt(qt)|θi]− Ct(s0) (3)
Subject to
E[ut(w˜t|θi)]− ψt(e, υt) + φt
(
Ωt,mt
)
>
E[ut(w˜t|θi)]− ψt(e, υt) + φt
(
Ωt,mt
)
(ICC) (4)
19See for instance Bowles [12]; Bowles and Polanía [14]; Deci and Ryan [23]; Frey [29]; and Frey and Jegen
[30].
20Adler and Bryan [4]
21For a formal description of crowding effects see the B.2 appendix.
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E[ut(w˜t|θi)]− ψt(e, υt) + φt
(
Ωt,mt
)
> U (PC) (5)
ut(w) > 0 ⇐⇒ wt(q) > 0 ⇐⇒ h(ut(w)) > 0 (LLC) (6)
(4) is A’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), and ensures the agent will prefer to
exert high effort.(5) is the A’s participation constraint (PC), and ensures the agent will
prefer to participate and accept the contract. Finally, (6) is a limited liability constraint
(LLC), and ensures the low payment never falls below zero level.
The solution to the above problem and for each t is a pair of contingent payments
{w,w} associated with q and q, respectively22. We analyze in the next section, under what
conditions is optimal for P to spend resources in changing the identity of A. Here, however,
we just show the pair of contingent payments which solves the spot contracting problem.
Let h : u(w) −→ w be the inverse function of the utility function h(u(w˜)) = (u(w˜))−1 =
w˜. Applying the variable change w˜t(q˜) = h(ut(w˜)) = (ut(w˜))
−1, we have the following
payments,
w = h(ut(w)) =
(
U − φt (Ωt,m(s0)) + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0))
)−1
(7)
w = h(ut(w)) =
(
U − φt (Ωt,m(s0))− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0))
)−1
. (8)
It is straightforward to see that identity lowers w and raises w. But, to be more precise,
with the relation between identity and the money that the health manager will need to
incentivize the good action of the doctor, we have to analyze how identity interacts with
either, the disutility from effort and intrinsic motivation. Then, we will analyze how these
two affect stochastic contingent payments. Finally, we will analyze how the socialization
process affects the temporal evolution of doctors’ identity distribution and how this evolution
affects stochastic contingent payments.
However, the principal cannot perfectly discriminate doctors attending their identity. He
only knows the distribution of identities. Then, the only thing he can do is to update the
distribution every period taking into account his own actions and the socialization process.
Once this updating process is completed, P is able to offer payments based on the expected
identity and expected intrinsic motivation of doctors23. Thus, at every period of the game,
he faces the following expected payments,
22How these contingent payments have been calculated is formally shown in the mathematical appendix,
section B.3
23This solution is suboptimal compared with the first best solution where effort level, identity and intrinsic
motivation are perfectly observable. Also is more far away from the first best compared with in a stronger
sense of the second best solution where only the effort is unobservable but identity and intrinsic motivation
are observable.
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w(E[υt|s0], E[φt|s0,Ωt]) =
(
U − E[φt|s0,Ωt] + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, E[υt|s0])
)−1
(9)
w(E[υt|s0], E[φt|s0,Ωt]) =
(
U − E[φt|s0,Ωt]− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, E[υt|s0])
)−1
. (10)
Then we write the Expected Cost Function for the health manager at each t as follows,
ECFt = n ·
(
θ1
(
U − E[φt|s0,Ωt] + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, E[υt|s0])
)−1)
+
n ·
(
(1− θ1)
(
U − E[φt|s0,Ωt]− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, E[υt|s0])
)−1)
+ Ct(s0).
Or, in a more reduced form,
ECFt = n · (θ1w(E[υt|s0], E[φt|s0,Ωt]) + (1− θ1)w(E[υt|s0], E[φt|s0,Ωt])) + Ct(s0) (11)
Let us use the superscript s0 ∈ {0, S} in ECF s0t , in order to differenciate the expected
cost function when P invests in motivational capital s0 = S, from the no investment case
s0 = 0. Then we have ECF St and ECF 0t .
ECF 0t = n · (θ1w(E[υt|0], E[φt|0,Ωt]) + (1− θ1)w(E[υt|0], E[φt|0,Ωt]))
ECF St = n · (θ1w(E[υt|S], E[φt|S,Ωt]) + (1− θ1)w(E[υt|S], E[φt|S,Ωt])) + ct(S)
As already said in Section 2, motivation can be considered another productive asset of
the organization. Another kind of capital of the organization. Then we can measure the
return of such investment in Motivational Capital computing the present value of the stream
of the expected costs saved by the health organization. This return can be measured with
the following mathematical expression,
NPV mk =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
ECF 0t − ECF St
]
(12)
Where, δt =
(
1
1+r
)t is the discount factor, and r is the discount rate. We say that the
principal has incentives to invest in motivational capital when NPV mk > 0 and we say that,
there is no incentive to invest in motivational capital when NPV mk < 0.
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4 Results
Now we will show how we compute the equilibrium payments to the spot contract for every
t = 0, 1, ..., T, .... We solve the principal’s problem under three alternative scenarios. In
the first the model is solved under the standard model assumptions, that is, in absence of
identity and intrinsic motivation. Then, we solve the model when identity and intrinsic
motivation play a role. When incentives beyond the money are present, two alternative
strategies are available for P : to invest in motivational capital s0 = S or not to invest at all
s0 = 0. We calculate the solution for each case. In the last subsection we make comparative
statics and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for investing in motivational capital.
We also discuss on some conclusions.
4.1 Benchmark: Second Best in the Standard Model
First, let us to solve the model in absence of identity and intrinsic motivation. This is the
standard economics result to the problem. Here pure monetary rewards are the only way
for P to incentivize A’s effort. In absence of motivations beyond the money, the stochastic
contingent payments which solve the spot contract for every t are the following,
w = h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
Ψ
)
(13)
w = h
(
U − θ0
∆θ
Ψ
)
(14)
Therefore, we can write the expected cost function24 ECF smt for each period t,
ECF smt = n ·
[
θ1h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
Ψ
)
+ (1− θ1h)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
Ψ
)]
(15)
Now we can calculate the spot expected profits Et[pismt |θ1], for P and the spot expected
utility for A. These two are shown with the following,
Et[pi
sm
t |θ1] = Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECF smt ] (16)
Et[USt |θ1] = θ1
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
Ψ
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
Ψ
)
(17)
For this benchmark case, characterized by the solution of the standard model in eco-
nomics, the total value of the contract for the principal and agents, measured respectively,
24We use the superscript sm to label the expected cost function as the corresponding with the standar
economic model case.
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by the present value of the stream of profits and the present value of the stream of the
expected utilities are,
Πsm =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[pi
sm
t |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt (Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECF smt ]) (18)
TE[UA|θ] = ∑Tt=0 δtEt[UAt |θ1]sm =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
θ1
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
Ψ
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
Ψ
)]
(19)
Finally, we take the present value of the sum of Et[UAt |θ1]sm and Et[pismt |θ1] as the present
value of the total surplus,
TSsm =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[UAt |θ1]sm + Et[pismt |θ1]
)
(20)
It is straightforward to see that the expected utility got byA and the profit level achieved
by P , both remain constant in every t. Therefore, the total surplus also remains constant
in every t and grows in a linear way over time. We will compare this result with the cases
in which incentives beyond the money play a role.
4.2 Investment in Motivational Capital
Now we assume that, both, identity and intrinsic motivation are present and play a role
in the doctors behaviour. First, we solve the model for the case in which health manager
chooses to invest in motivational capital or in the case that he takes s0 = S action. This case
is what we interpret as the crowding in case. In this case, and for every t, spot payments
are such that,
wS(Et[υt|S], Et[φt|Ωt, S]) = h
(
U − Et[φt|Ωt, S] + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
(21)
wS(Et[υt|S], Et[φt|Ωt, S]) = h
(
U − Et[φt|Ωt, S]− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
(22)
With a pair of payments in t = 0 such that,
w(E0[υ0], E[φ0]) = h
(
U − E[φ0] + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψ0(e, E0[υ0])
)
(23)
w(E0[υ0], E0[φ0]) = h
(
U − E0[φ0]− θ0
∆θ
ψ0(e, E0[υ0])
)
(24)
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These two payments of t = 0 will be exactly the same for the case in which P does
not invest any amount in motivational capital, say when s0 = 0. Then, for the case we are
analyzing now, s0 = S we write the following expected cost function for health manager,
ECF St = n ·
(
θ1w
S(Et[υt|S], Et[φt|Ωt, S])
)
+n · ((1− θ1)wS(Et[υt|S], Et[φt|Ωt, S]))+ Ct(S). (25)
Now we can calculate the spot expected profit Et[piSt |θ1] for P and the spot expected
utility Et[USt |θ1] for A.
Et[pi
S
t |θ1] = Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECF St ] (26)
Et[USt |θ1] = θ1
(
U − E[φt|Ωt, S] + (1−θ0)∆θ ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
+(1− θ1)
(
U − Et[φt|Ωt, S]− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
− ψit(et, υt(s0) + φit
(
Ωt,mt(s0)
)
(27)
Where the superscript i = 1, ..., n is to distinguish the particular doctor who is contract-
ing and experiencing the utility of this contract. Finally, as we made in the previous case,
we compute the present value of the sum of spot profits and the sum of the spot utilities,
and also the expresion which measures the present value of the total surplus TSS when P
action is s0 = S.
ΠS =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[pi
S
t |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECF St ]
)
(28)
TE[US|θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[pi
S
t |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
θ1
(
U − E[φt|Ωt, S] + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)]
+
T∑
t=0
δt
[
(1− θ1)
(
U − Et[φt|Ωt, S]− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)]
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+
T∑
t=0
δt
[
φit
(
Ωt,M)
)
− ψit(et, υt(S)
]
(29)
TSS =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[USt |θ1] + Et[piSt |θ1]
)
(30)
4.3 No-investment in Motivational Capital
The third case we analyze is the no investment case or s0 = 0. In such a case the health
manager does not face any cost from investing behaviour in changing identities by supporting
doctors’ mission. Then despite incentives beyond the money play a determinant role in A’s
behaviour the mere use of monetary rewards to incentivize doctors’ effort causes crowding
out of intrinsic motivation and a loss in identity. In this case, the spot payments are,
w0(Et[υt|0], Et[φt|Ωt, 0]) = h
(
U − Et[φt|Ωt, 0] + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
(31)
w0(Et[υt|0], Et[φt|Ωt, 0]) = h
(
U − Et[φt|Ωt, 0]− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
(32)
Payments in t = 0 are exactly the same as those described in the previous subsection.
With all these payments we can state the expected cost function for this incentive policy in
every t = 0, 1, ..., T, ..., that we call ECF 0t .
ECF 0t = n · (θ1w0(Et[υt|0], Et[φt|Ωt, 0]))
+n · ((1− θ1)w0(Et[υt|0], Et[φt|Ωt, 0])) (33)
Now we can calculate the spot expected profit Et[piSt |θ1] for P and the spot expected
utility Et[USt |θ1] for A.
Et[pi
0
t |θ1] = Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− ECF 0t (34)
Et[U0t |θ1] = θ1
(
U − Et[φt|Ωt, 0] + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
+(1− θ1)
(
U − Et[φt|Ωt, 0]− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
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−ψit(e, υit(0)) + φit
(
Ωt,m
)
(35)
Also for this case we complete the results showing the present value of the sum of spot
profits and the sum of the spot utilities, and also the expresion which measures the present
value of the social welfare TS0 under the incentive policy s0 = 0.
Π0 =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[pi
0
t |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECF 0t ]
)
(36)
TE[U0|θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
θ1
(
U − E[φt|Ωt, 0] + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)]
+
T∑
t=0
δt
[
(1− θ1)
(
U − Et[φt|Ωt, 0]− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)]
+
T∑
t=0
δt
[
φit
(
Ωt,m)
)
− ψit(et, υt(0))
]
(37)
TS0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[U0t |θ1] + Et[pi0t |θ1]
)
(38)
4.4 Comparative statics
Our model shows that a doctor who develops identity from her organization or job whithin
the health organization, is willing to work for lower overall pay. This way, less variation in
payment schedule is needed in order to induce her to exert high level of effort. Thus, this less
variation in payments results in additional cost savings for P , or the health organization. In
addition, when doctors are risk averse, less variation in payments means that they must be
compensated with a lower risk premiun, and this constitutes another cost saving source for
the health organization. When these cost advantages are high enough, it can be worthwhile
for P to undertake a costly program to promote doctors’ “good” identity.
Comparative statics of our model show when identity and intrinsic motivation could
play a bigger role in motivating doctors and hence when a health organization could find
profitable to invest in developing doctors’ identity and crowding in their intrinsic motivation.
Changes in each parameter of the model will affect the profitability of such an investment on
Motivational Capital and will be a key question to analyze the P behaviour. If inculcating
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identity is cheap, if there is much uncertainty, if doctors’ effort is hard to observe, if doctors
are especially risk averse, if high effort is critical to the organization’s output, then the use
of an identity-oriented motivational incentive scheme, would be more profitable and more
likely to be used.
4.4.1 Motivational Capital
One very first result that it is straightforward to set, comes from the comparison between
the present value of the sum of spot profits for P when he takes S action and when he takes
0 action. That is, firstly calculating the Net Present Value of the A’s motivational capital
(NPV mk), and then checking if it is positive or negative.This first result is formally shown
in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let T the number of periods the game will be played. For n and δ large
enough, and γ small enough, there exists a threshold t∗ such that,
n ·∑t∗t=0 δt [θ1(w0t −wSt ) + (1− θ1)(w0t −wSt )] = ∑t∗t=0 δtCt(S)
and for which
i. If t∗ 6 T then NPV mk > 0 and P finds profitable to invest in motivational capital
and choose the s0 = S strategy.
ii. If t∗ > T then NPV mk < 0 and P finds profitable not to invest in motivational capital
and choose the s0 = 0 strategy.
Figure 4 shows graphically this first result. The graph on the left side of the figure 4
shows jointly, and as a function of time t, both, P ’s expected cost function in the case of
s0 = 0, and P ’s expected cost function in the case of s0 = S. The discounted sum of the
difference between these two functions will be the measure of the net present value of an
investment in motivational capital for P . In the graph three different cases are shown with
the goal of being illustrative of the proposition 1 results.
The graph on the right side of the figure 4 shows the value of the NPV mk as a function
of time t. In this graph also the three cases shown in the other graph are shown. The t∗
threshold determines the critical point below which the best strategy for P will be not to
invest.
The motivational capital profitability threshold t∗ is the key variable for P ’s optimal
action choice. This threshold depens on several variables. The relations given between
these variables and the motivational capital profitability threshold is what determines P ’s
optimal decision in this contracting game. We will focus on the analysis of these relations
in order to draw conditions under which one or another strategy, s0 ∈ {0, S} is optimal.
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Figure 4: Net Present Value of the Motivational Capital.
4.4.2 Effort Effectiveness and Motivational Capital
The model captures A’s effort effectiveness with the θi ∈ [0, 1] parameter, where i = 0, 1 are
the subscripts meaning A’s low effort and high effort action, respectively. A natural way to
read this parameter is as a probability of high performance conditional to effort action. For
θi to be informative, it has to be θ1 > θ0. Comparative statics on θ0 allows us to stablish
that greater values of θ0, closer to θ1, make higher incentives necessary in order to elicit
doctors to do high effort. In addition to this, crowding out effect push incentives to raise
when these monetary rewards are high.
In the light of previous findings, we can establish that pure monetary rewards as incen-
tivization strategy is very expensive when the effort is hard to observe due to the low quality
of the signal used to do this. In such cases, for P to implement a crowding in strategy as
incentive policy (in our model s0 = S) results more likely to be optimal when effort is hard
to observe and hard to reward. This is because, despite the cost of investing in motivational
capital Ct(S), identity allows P to save costs because he will not need to incentivize effort.
Taking into account the fact that with high θ0 monetary incentives have to be very high,
savings due to s0 = S strategy will be very high and therefore investing in motivational
capital will be optimal because the net present value of such an investment turns to be
positive earlier.
Proposition 2 summarizes the above result:
Proposition 2. Let NPV mk
θˆ0
and NPV mk
θ¯0
be the net present value of making investments
in motivational capital for the cases of θˆ0 and θ¯0 respectively. Let tθˆ0 and tθ¯0 be the number
of periods necessary so that the net present value of investing in motivational capital turns
positive in each case θˆ0 and θ¯0, respectively. Then, holding everything else constant and
assuming limited liability constraint, for every θˆ0, θ¯0 ∈ [0, 1] such that θˆ0 > θ¯0, NPV mkθˆ0
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will be higher than NPV mk
θ¯0
and therefore tθˆ0 < tθ¯0. Then, always will be more profitable to
invest in motivational capital when the value of θ0 is higher.
Thus another consistent relation is drawn from the model. For lower values of the
probability of high performance conditioned to low effort p(q = q|e = e) = θ0, for P to
take the s0 = S action to invest in motivational capital always will be more profitable and
therefore more likely. This result is consistent with what Akerlof and Kranton (2005) state
about identity as an incentive for work motivation.
[. . . ] a way to motivate employees, different than incentives from monetary com-
pensation.
[. . . ] a change in identity is the ideal motivator if, [. . . ] the effort of a worker is
either hard to observe or hard to reward.
4.4.3 Organizational Size and Agents Population
Other key fact which can make the investment in motivational capital more likely to be
optimal strategy in the short term is the size of agents population involved in the game. In
other words, the size of the health organization in which the problem of incentives must be
resolved.
P must decide s0 ∈ {0, S} and faces Ct(s0) cost. This cost, as it has been defined in
previous section, will be Ct(0) = 0 in the case of no-investment behaviour and Ct(S) =
S +
∑T
t=1 δ
t [γS]
Which choice will result optimal for P will come determined by the sign of the Net
Present Value of the motivational capital:
NPV mk =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
ECF 0t − ECF St
]
When the NPV mk is positive then investment in motivational capital is the best choice
for P . As it has been shown in proposition 1, there is a threshold t∗ which determines the
border between the optimality of investing or not in motivational capital. The posterior
analysis lies in characterizing which values of the other parameters in the model affect this
threshold, raising or lowering it.
Focusing our attention over the number of contracts n that P must perform, and taking
into account that the organizational change and the initial investment that P has to do in
t = 0 is a fixed cost, we can state the following result shown in the proposition 3.
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Proposition 3. Let ∆EC =
[
ECF 0t − ECF St
]
be the saved expected cost for P in every
t > 1 when he chooses to invest in motivational capital. By proposition 1 (P1) we know that
there exists a given t > 1 for which the sign of the ∆EC will turn positive. The total value
of ∆EC will be higher when the number of contracts performed by P, n, would be higher.
Then for every pair n1, n2 such that n1 > n2 the initial investment in motivational capital
S will be compensated earlier with n1, and t∗n1 < t
∗
n2
(P1). Therefore, for P to choose S
action will be more likely to be optimal for higher values of n.
Figure 5: A comparison between the net present value of two different agents population n1 and
n2.
The result of the proposition 3 is summarized in figure 5. The figure shows the Net
Present Value corresponding to the cases n1 and n2. Shown jointly, these two functions
illustrate how, when the number of contracts that P must perform is higher, then earlier
the NPV mk turns positive.
5 Conclusion
We introduce the notions of identity and intrinsic motivation in a model of principal agent
with moral hazard to capture the idea of how incentives beyond the money can be effective
in order to elicit agents, doctors in our case, to exert high effort. The incorporation of
such inner motivators of the individual behaviour has been done on the basis of an extense
literature on intrinsic motivation and identity25. The aim of the paper then, can be summed
25See for instance Frey [29]; Frey and Jegen [30]; and Benabou and Tirole [7] [8]; for the case of intrinsic
motivation and Akerlof and Kranton [1] [2] [3] and Benabou and Tirole [8]; for the case of identity.
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up with the following quote of Fehr et al. [28]:
[...] concerns for fairness have an important impact on the actual and the optimal
design of contracts. Traditional contract theory has neglected these effects, but
they have to be taken into account if we want to fully understand the functioning
of real world contracts and the associated incentive schemes. [...] This approach
is a first step to developing richer models that may become part of “behavioral
contract theory.”
Introducing these notions of identity in a principal agent model, assuming that doctors
are intrinsically motivated and also that they can change identity and align their particular
goals with the organizational goals, the present work has shown the conditions under which
to spend resources crowding in doctors’ intrinsic motivation and changing their identity is
profitable for health organizations.
These conditions are, for instance, the lenght of the contracts offered, the informative
value of the signal used to observe and incentivize effort, the total number of contracts that
a principal must sign, the initial distribution of identity and intrinsic motivation between
the agents and also the properties of such distributions.
Taking all into account, what we conclude from this work is: an initial investment in
long-term incentives beyond the money and crowding in policies, though costly at inception,
will result more effective to control public health expenditure and achieve better outcomes
than usual monetary and regulatory incentives. In other terms, there is an incentive for
governments to invest in motivational capital in the public health. Then, Governments,
Health Care Authorities and Health Care Advisors, should take into account and incorporate
these findings to the policy design. For instance, from the proposition 1 a planner could
conclude that monetary incentives are the best way to achieve a specifical goal in the short
term. Something like, a sudden increase in waiting lists, stationary flu, or other sudden
epidemic episodes. However for the long term goals: quality, efficiency, effectivenes, research
and develop results, then proposition 1 establishes, that a change in identity and making
investments in motivational capital is the most profitable action for the health care manager.
Another conclusion taht is straightforward to derive from the above established ones is
that, wherever the health care managers will be politically designed, their time horizon will
be the legislative time period and then it is more likely that they are focused in the short
term goals. Thus, they will have a willingness to chosse pure monetary rewards as incentive
schemes for health, despite in the long term the best choice is the investmetn in motivational
capiatl. Anyway these conclusions are interesting future research questions which, should
be testedand studied in depth in the future.
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A Additional Notation
B Mathematical Appendix
B.1 Socialization: the Evolution of the Identities Distribution.
Let F (υt|s0) be the probability distribution function of the As’ identity υt, where υt ∈ [υ, υ],
υ < υ and υ, υ ∈ R+.
Assume that for any decision choice of s0, F0(υ0|S) = F0(υ0|0) = F0(υ0). Socialization
will reflect evolution of identity distribution through time, conditional to the choice of s0.
We separate the socialization into two cases: socialization and conflict. The distribution
of identity will evolve oppositely depending on the P ’s s0 investement strategy.
Thus for every value of υt = υ∗ when s0 = 0 the distribution function at any period
t is stochastically dominated by the distribution function of the previous period t − 1.
Alternatively for every value of υt when s0 = S the distribution function at any period t
dominates stochastically the distribution function of the previous period t−1. This property
is formally written as follows,
Ft(υt = υ
∗|0) > Ft−1(υt−1 = υ∗|0) > · · · > F0(υ0)
> · · · > Ft−1(υt−1 = υ∗|S) > Ft(υt = υ∗|S)
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Figure 6: Identity. Stochastic Dominance.
Figure 7: Identity. Time Evolution of Densities.
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Finally assume that Ft(υt|S) converges to put all the probability on the upper bound of
the identity υt = υ, and Ft(υt|0) converges to put all the probability on the lower bound of
the identity υt = υ.
lim
t→∞
Ft(υt|S) = λ where λ =
{
1 if υ = υ
0 otherwise
and
lim
t→∞
Ft(υt|0) = 1, for every υ ∈ [υ, υ].
Let Et[υt|s0] be the mathematical expectation in t of the value of υt conditional to the
incentive policy s0. Implications of the s0 conditioned stochastic dominance on Et[υt|s0]:
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et[υt+1|0] < Et[υt|0]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et+1[υt+1|S] > Et[υt|S]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et[υt|0] < Et[υt|S]
Where,
Et[υt|s0] =
∫ υ
υ
υtf(υt|s0)dυt
B.2 Crowding effects.
Let φt(Ωt,m(s0)) ∈ (0,Φ] be a function which measures the intrinsic motivation of the
agent, where (0,Φ] ∈ R+. Let m(s0) ∈ {m,M} be the amount of intrinsic motivation of
a doctor with m,M ∈ R+ and M > m. First, let us to assume, in line with crowding
effects literature, that intrinsic motivation depends negatively from incentives intensity Ωt.
Formally,
∂φt(Ωt,m(s0))
∂Ωt
< 0; with ∂
2φt(Ωt,m)
∂Ω2t
< 0 and ∂
2φt(Ωt,M)
∂Ω2t
> 0.
What we are assuming here is that, elicit good action by the only use of incentives crowds
out A’s intrinsic motivation. However, when P invest in motivational capital and supports
A’s mission preferences to change her identity, then the higher identity the doctor has, less
incentives she needs to do good action. Therefore, this crowds in A’s intrinsic motivation
over time:
dφt(Ωt,M)
dt
> 0
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Figure 8: Intrinsic Motivation. Stochastic Dominance
Intrinsic motivation φt also is affected, in this case possitively, by the principal investment
supporting doctor’s mission preferences. Formally, as the assumption B2 states, for any fixed
Ωt = Ω
∗ ∈ [0,∞), we have ∆(mt)φt = φt((Ω)∗,M)− φt((Ω)∗,m) > 0.
Doctors may have different degrees of intrinsic motivation in t = 0. The model captures
this heterogeneity with a probability distribution function defined over the value of the
intrinsic motivation in t = 0, G0(φ0). For any φ0 = φ∗ ∈ [0,Φ] the distribution function
gives back, G0(φ∗) = Prob(φ0 6 φ∗). Let g0(φ0) be the density associated to G0(φ0) which,
we will read as, for any φ0 = φ∗ ∈ [0,Φ] g0(φ∗) = Prob(φ0 = φ∗).
Once P has inferred G0(φ0) and taking into account that his offer in t = 0 will affect A’s
intrinsic motivation through crowding effects, the he can infer the subsequents conditional
distributions over φt, say, Gt(φ1|Ωt, s0). In order to make this two conditionals informa-
tive about the intertemporal changes in the distribution of the intrinsic motivation, let us
formulate some assumptions.
First we assume stochastic dominance.
Gt(φt = φ
∗|0,Ωt) > Gt−1(φt−1 = φ∗|0,Ωt−1) > · · · > G0(φ0)
> · · · > Gt−1(φt−1 = φ∗|S,Ωt−1) > Gt(φt = φ∗|S,Ωt)
Assume that Gt(φ1|Ωt, S) converges to put all the probability on the upper bound of
intrinsic motivation φt = Φ and Gt(φ1|Ωt, 0) converges to put all the probability on the
lower bound of intrinsic motivation φt = 0.
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Figure 9: Intrinsic Motivation. Time Evolution of Densities.
lim
t→∞
Gt(φt|S,Ωt) = ρ where ρ =
{
1 if φt = Φ
0 otherwise
and
lim
t→∞
Gt(φt|0,Ωt) = 1, for every φt ∈ [0,Φ].
Let Et[φt|s0,Ωt] be the mathematical expectation in t of the value of φt conditional to the
incentive policy s0 and the intensity of incentives26 Ωt. Implications of the s0 conditioned
stochastic dominance on Et[φt|·]:
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et+1[φt+1|0,Ωt+1] < Et[φt|0,Ωt]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et+1[φt+1|S,Ωt+1] > Et[υt|S,Ωt]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et[φt|0,Ωt] < Et[φt|S,Ωt]
Where,
Et[φt|s0] =
∫ Φ
0
φtf(φt|s0,Ωt)dφt
26Both, incentive policy and the intensity of monetary incentives are positively correlated ∀s0 ∈ {0, S}
and ∀Ωt ∈ [0,∞]. Then, s0 is sufficient informative statistic and we can simplify the model using only it as
informative signal about intrinsic motivation E[φt|·].
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B.3 Problem Solving
Let us now to simplify the notation in order to make algebraic operations easier. We relabel
some variables of the model in order to do that. All changes are summarized in table 1.
Utility from monetary payments: ut(w) = u ; ut(w) = u
Disutility from effort: ψt(e, υt(s0)) = ψt
Intrinsic motivation φt(∆wt,m(st)) = φt
P ’s revenue function: Rt(q) = R ; Rt(q) = R
Change of variables: w = h(u) ; w = h(u)
Probability variation: ∆θ = (θ1 − θ0)
Reservation utility: U
Table 1: Notational simplification
Then we can rewrite the P ’s problem as follows:
Max{wt(qt),s0}θ1
(
R− h(u))− (1− θ1) (R− h(u))− st (39)
Subject to
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u− ψt + φt > θ0u+ (1− θ0)u+ φt (ICC) (40)
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u− ψt + φt > U (PC) (41)
Note that the P ’s objective function is now strictly concave in u and u, because h(·) is
strictly convex. The function u−1 = h(u) gives back ex post the monetary payments from
utility levels. We have now linear constraints and a nonempty interior of the constrained
set and therefore the problem is concave and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are sufficient and
necessary for characterizing optimality.
Letting λ and µ be the non-negative multipliers associated respectively with the (ICC)
and (PC) constraints. First-order conditions of this problem yield:
1
u′(w)
= µ+ λ
∆θ
θ1
(42)
1
u′(w)
= µ− λ ∆θ
1− θ1 (43)
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The equations (9) and (10) jointly with (6) and (7) form a system of four equations with
four variables (w,w, µ, λ) which allows us to calculate the solution. Multiplying (9) by θ1
and (10) by (1− θ1) and adding those two modified equations, we obtain,
µ =
θ1
u′(w)
+
1− θ1
u′(w)
> 0 (44)
Hence, µ > 0 and the participation constraint (7) is binding. Using (11) and (9), we
also obtain,
λ =
(1− θ1)θ1
∆θ
(
1
u′(w)
− 1
u′(w)
)
> 0 (45)
And the incentive compatibility constraint (6) is also binding. Thus we can obtain
inmediately the values of u(w) and u(w) by solving a system with two equations and two
unknowns. The result is shown below,
ut(w) = U − φt (Ωt,m(s0)) + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0)) (46)
ut(w) = U − φt (Ωt,m(s0))− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0)). (47)
B.4 Effort effectiveness: some analysis on θi.
Preliminary assumptions over θi:
P (qt = q|et = e) = θ1 P (qt = q|et = e) = θ0
P (qt = q|et = e) = 1− θ1 P (qt = q|et = e) = 1− θ0
Assume also that performance is an informative signal about effort, θ1 > θ0. Further,
results show that in any case, benchmark case or standard economic model, investment in
motivational capital, and no-investment in motivational capital, the stochastic parameter
θi only affects the stochastic payments w˜t(q˜t).
Let us to take the standard model’s stochastic payments w˜t as start point. We analyze
the impact of θ0 on both, w = h
(
U − θ0
θ1−θ0 Ψ
)
and w = h
(
U + 1−θ0
θ1−θ0 Ψ
)
. By definition
h′(·) > 0 and h′′(·) > 0
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dw(q)
dθ0
= h′(u)
∂
(
U − θ0
θ1−θ0 Ψ
)
∂θ0
= −h′(u)
[ Ψθ1
(θ1 − θ0)2
]
< 0
The sign of this first derivative of h(u(w)) from θ0 is negative for any value θ0 ∈ [0, θ1].
Then the low stochastic payment depends negatively from θ0
Now we calculate the second derivative of w from θ0,
d2w(q)
dθ20
=
[
− h′′(u) ·
( Ψθ1
(θ1 − θ0)2
)2]
+ [−h′(u)] ·
( 2Ψθ1
(θ1 − θ0)3
)
< 0
The second derivative is negative. Then, the value of the utility experienced from the low
payment, decreases more quickly on θ0 as mean as the latter increases. Is straightforward
to se that in the limit the low payment w converges to −∞ when θ0 goes to θ1
lim
θ0→θ1
h
(
U − θ0Ψ
θ1 − θ0
)
= −∞
On the other hand, the first derivative on θ0 of the high payment is as follows,
dw(q)
dθ0
= h′(u) · ∂u(w(q))
∂θ0
= h′(u) ·
∂
(
U + (1−θ0)Ψ
θ1−θ0
)
∂θ0
= h′(u) ·Ψ (1− θ1)
(θ1 − θ0)2 > 0
The sign of the first derivative in the case of high payment, is possitive. Then, as mean as
the value of θ0 increases, the high payment also increases. The sign of the second derivative
show whether the payment increases faster or slower as mean as θ0 increases.
d2w(q)
dθ20
=
[
h′′(u) ·
∂
(
U+
(1−θ0)Ψ
θ1−θ0
)
∂θ0
]
·
(
Ψ (1−θ1)
(θ1−θ0)2
)
+
[
h′(u) · 2Ψ
(θ1−θ1)3
]
=
= h′′(u) ·
(
Ψ (1−θ1)
(θ1−θ0)2
)2
+ h′(u) · 2Ψ
(θ1−θ1)3 > 0
Is straightforward to see that the high payment is increasing in θ0 and this positive
relation is also increasing in θ0. Then, when θ0 value converges to θ1, the high stochastic
optimal payment converges to ∞.
lim
θ0→θ1
h
(
U +
(1− θ0)Ψ
θ1 − θ0
)
=∞
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Figure 10: Payments and the informative value of the signal
Figure
Finally we analyze how Ω = w − w evolves with the informative value of the signal.
That is, how the informative value of the signal, ∆θ = θ1 − θ0 affects the range and the
amount of the incentives. As it is shown, as more close to θ1 is θ0, then lower will be w and
higher will be w, and therefore Ω = ∆w must be greater. Analogously, as more separate is
θ0 from θ1, then higher will be w, lower will be w, and therefore Ω = ∆w must be lower. In
conclusion, signal informativeness makes monetary incentives less necessary.
Now, assume that intrinsic motivation and identity plays a role in the agent behaviour.
Then, as it is shown in the section 3.2.4. of this paper, the problem solving payments are,
w = h(u(w)) = h
(
U − φ (Ω,m(s0)) + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψ(e, υ(s0))
)
w = h(u(w)) = h
(
U − φ (Ω,m(s0))− θ0
∆θ
ψ(e, υ(s0))
)
.
Formalized in section 3.2.3. there is a negative interplay between monetary incentives
and intrinsic motivation. More monetary incentives hurt intrinsic motivation by crowding
out effect and analogously less incentives improves intrinsic motivation.
∂φ (Ω,m(s0))
∂Ω
< 0 (48)
Then, this negative relation strenghten the effect that the informative value of the signal
has over incentives. More precisaely, in presence of intrinsic motivation, for every given
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value of θ0, Ω will be greater. This result is easily drawn from the fact that a greater θ0
means greater ω and the (48) equation.
Respect to the role played by identity, higher identity means more alignment between
organizational or P ’s goals and A’s goals. In the model more identity means that A expe-
rience a lower disutility from effort, which will be zero in the limit when agent achieve full
identity.
ψt(e, υ) = 0 (49)
Thus, the incentives to elicit A to exert effort will not depend on the effectiveness of the
signal θi because for the agent will chosse e = e action in every t due to this goals alignment
and full identity and to link higher expected payments to the choice of e = e action is not
necessary.
B.5 Organizational Size and Agents Population
Let w0t and w0t be the contingent payments when s0 = 0 and Let wSt and wSt be the contingent
payments when s0 = S.
Let now E[w0t |θ1] = θ1w0t +(1−θ1)w0t and E[wSt |θ1] = θ1wSt +(1−θ1)wSt be the expected
payments when the action choosen by P is s0 = 0 and s0 = S respectively. By identity and
crowding effects we know that, for eny given population n of agents, E[w0t |θ1]−E[wSt |θ1] > 0.
Let n1 and n2 be two different population of agents such that n1 > n2. We can write
the expected saved costs for each case respectively as follows: n1
[
E[w0t |θ1]− E[wSt |θ1]
]
and
n2
[
E[w0t |θ1]− E[wSt |θ1]
]
. Given that n1 > n2 it is straightforward to see that in every t > 1,
n1
[
E[w0t |θ1]− E[wSt |θ1]
]
> n2
[
E[w0t |θ1]− E[wSt |θ1]
]
.
Then, following proposition 1, the number of periods necessary to turn the Net Present
Value of motivational capital possitive NPV mk > 0 in each case t∗1 and t∗2 will be such that
t∗1 < t
∗
2 and therefore it is more likely to invest in motivational capital, when the number of
contracts or n that P must perform is higher.
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